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Secure communication requires message authentication. In this paper we address the problem of
how to authenticate quantum information sent through a quantum channel between two commu-
nicating parties with the minimum amount of resources. Specifically, our objective is to determine
whether one elementary quantum message (a qubit) can be authenticated with a key of minimum
length. We show that, unlike the case of classical-message quantum authentication, this is not
possible.
PACS numbers: 3.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Lx.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography deals about communication in the pres-
ence of adversaries [1], and one of its fundamental goals
is to provide message authentication (also called data-
origin authentication) [2]. This is a process whereby a
party is corroborated as the original source of some spec-
ified data created, transmitted, or stored at some time
in the past. To assure message authentication, one then
must have the ability to detect any data manipulation
by unauthorized parties. This is particularly important
in public-key cryptography, in which users must be con-
fident about the authenticity of the public-keys of the
partners involved in the communication.
Classical cryptography provides data-origin authenti-
cation by means of two general techniques: message
authentication codes (MACs) [3], and digital-signature
schemes [4]. In both cases, the authentication process
is specified by two algorithms: an encoding, or tagging
algorithm (possibly stochastic), and a decoding or ver-
ification algorithm. When the sender (Alice) wishes to
send a certified message to a recipient (Bob), she gener-
ates, employing the encoding algorithm, an authentica-
tion tag or a signature (in both cases a function of the
message and a secret encoding-key) and appends it to
the message before actually sending it. Notice that this
tagged-message may be sent in the clear; the authen-
tication problem is, therefore, very different to the one
associated to encryption since no secrecy is necessary for
secure message authentication. On the reception side,
Bob verifies the authenticity of the message by means of
the specified decoding procedure, which depends on the
message, the tag, and a decoding-key. This algorithm
returns a bit indicating when Bob must regard the mes-
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sage as authentic, and accept it as coming from Alice,
and when he must discard it. The basic requirement is
that the tags, which are produced by the encoding algo-
rithm, be accepted as valid by the verification algorithm
when a decoding-key corresponding to the encoding-key
is used on the tagging procedure. When a message au-
thentication scheme fulfills this requisite it is said that it
provides perfect deterministic decoding.
Choosing between MACs and digital-signature
schemes depends on the communication context.
Typically, MACs are employed when the receiver is
predetermined at the time of message transmission,
and the decoding-key he owns, which can be equal to
the encoding-key, is secret. In signature schemes, on
the contrary, the decoding-key is public, and therefore
known also to the adversary (Eve); this fact guarantees
that anybody can verify the authenticity of data (univer-
sal verification), and that Alice cannot later repudiate
having signed the message, since no one but she owns
the encoding-key.
Although several information-theoretic secure MACs
have been proposed (see, e.g., [3]), the security provided
by signature schemes depends on unproven assumptions
related to the intractability of certain difficult math-
ematical problems, such as the prime-factorization of
large numbers [5] or the discrete-logarithm computation
[6]. Unfortunately, if a quantum computer is ever built,
Shor’s quantum algorithms [7] could break classical sig-
nature schemes easily, i.e., in polynomial time.
The use of quantum resources in user authentication
has been proposed before in QKD scenarios [8, 9]. More
recently, several proposals of general message authentica-
tion using quantum resources have been made. Gottes-
man and Chuang [10] have proposed a quantum version
of classical digital-signature schemes. Their technique re-
quires limited circulation of the public key, but it allows
unconditionally secure authentication of classical mes-
sages. A disadvantage of this protocol, as stated by the
authors, is that it requires several non-reusable key-bits
for each message-bit signed. Leung [11], in another re-
cent paper, also studies quantummessage authentication.
2Her protocol requires a two-way classical channel between
partners, thus making the overall security dependent on
the security of that channel. In a previous article [12]
some of us proposed a class of quantum authentication
protocols that allow secure authentication of classical bi-
nary messages with one bit as the authentication key.
This improves the efficiency of classical MACs, that re-
quire, for the authentication of binary messages, at least
two-bit keys. In this paper we adapt this class of proto-
cols to the authentication of quantum messages (qubits),
and study its security. We show that, using the amount of
quantum resources needed to authenticate one-bit classi-
cal messages, the intrinsic nature of quantum information
makes it impossible to detect every unauthorized quan-
tum data manipulation by a potential adversary, thus
making qubit authentication not possible.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we de-
scribe a general class of one-qubit message authentication
protocols. This class can be seen as a generalization of
the one presented in [12] to authenticate classical binary
messages. In Section III we analyze the security of these
protocols against several attacks. First, we analyze the
no-message attack, in which the sender has not initiated
the transmission (there is no message in the channel), and
Eve attempts to prepare a fake quantum message with
the intention of passing Bob’s verification test. Then,
we study more subtle attacks, those in which Eve has
access to what is transmitted. After studying all these
attacks we show that it is not possible to keep the failure
probability of the authentication protocol below one.
II. QUANTUM MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
Suppose Alice needs to send a certified quantum mes-
sage to Bob. The goal is to make Bob confident about the
authenticity of the message and sender. For the sake of
simplicity, let us assume that the state to send certified is
an arbitrary qubit described by the density operator ρM
operating on some two-dimensional message space M.
This qubit may be locally generated by her, or she may
be acting as a relay station between two other parties.
In order to certify this message, Alice follows the stan-
dard procedure in classical authentication: She appends
a tag to the message in such a way that the recipient,
Bob, may verify the tag and so convince himself about
the identity of the message originator. The difference
with respect to the classical case is that now the tag is
also a quantum state, given by the density operator ρT ,
of some tag space T . Therefore, the quantum tagged-
message is described by the operator ρE = ρM⊗ ρT that
acts on the state space E =M⊗T . Since our objective
is to determine whether authentication is possible with
the minimum amount of resources, we shall regard T as
a two-dimensional space. Although this might seem a
strong restriction, it can be shown that having a bigger
tag does not improve the security of the protocol, at least
when dealing with an ideal, error-free quantum channel,
as is the case considered here. In a noisy channel, a big-
ger tag space would certainly be useful in the detection
of errors in the channel that might alter the message, in
the way Quantum Error Correcting Codes (QECC) usu-
ally work. We shall return to this point with more detail
later, at the end of Section III. Finally, since we are inter-
ested in perfect deterministic decoding, valid and invalid
tags must belong, respectively, to orthogonal subspaces
in T , but, since one cannot find orthogonal mixed states
in a two-dimensional space (T ), ρT must be a pure state,
namely ρT = |0〉〈0|T .
No authentication is possible without a previously
shared secret between the two communicating parties.
This key, which may have been exchanged directly or
by means of a trusted third party (a certification au-
thority), can be a classical or a quantum one. In our
proposal we shall assume that Alice and Bob share a
maximally entangled quantum state as their secret au-
thentication key. For instance, each of the parties could
own one qubit of a publicly-known singlet state |ψ〉AB =
1√
2
(|01〉AB − |10〉AB). It can be argued that, in a real-
istic scenario, dealing with classical keys would be more
advantageous. In fact, our protocol can equally operate
with one-bit classical keys. However, we prefer the use of
quantum keys for their better key-management proper-
ties —no copying of the key remains undetected if extra
quantum key is included for this check.
The main difference between authenticating a classical
message and a quantum one resides in the nature of ρM.
If ρM is a quantum message, it belongs to the continuous
space of density operators acting onM. Since Alice may
act just as a relay station, we shall assume that ρM is
unknown to her. In the classical case, there are only two
classical messages to send, ‘0’ or ‘1’. To encode them un-
ambiguously Alice and Bob need to agree on a particular
orthonormal basis of M, {|0〉M, |1〉M}, so ρM would be
restricted to be either |0〉〈0|M or |1〉〈1|M. This decision
can be made openly, adding no more secrecy between the
parties.
According to the notation introduced above, the state
of the global system (key+tagged-message) is given by
ρABE = |ψ〉〈ψ|AB ⊗ ρE = |ψ〉〈ψ|AB ⊗ ρM ⊗ |0〉〈0|T . (1)
Next Alice performs, on her part of |ψ〉AB and on the
tagged-message, an encoding operation EAE . We may
write this unitary operation in the general form:
EAE = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ 1E + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ UE , (2)
where UE is some arbitrary unitary quantum operation
on E . Basically, the action of EAE is equivalent to the
selection, triggered by the state of a one-bit key, of one
operator from an arbitrary pair of publicly-known uni-
tary ones (in our case, 1E and UE). Once this operator is
selected, it is applied to ρE before sending it through the
quantum channel. The reason to enforce the unitarity of
3these two operators is that it allows Bob to easily undo
their action. But this is not the only way in which per-
fect deterministic decoding can be achieved. As shown
in [13, 14, 15], more general quantum operations, such as
trace-preserving completely-positive (TPCP) maps, can,
under certain circumstances, be reversed, and, therefore,
used in EAE instead of 1E and UE . However, for sim-
plicity in the formalism we limit ourselves to the case of
unitary operators.
If we denote by ρeABE the density operator describ-
ing the state of the global system after the encoding
operation, i.e., ρeABE = EAEρABEE
†
AE , then the state
of the tagged-message that Alice sends to Bob through
the quantum channel between them is given by ρeE =
trAB (ρ
e
ABE), where ρ
e
ABE , making use of (2), can be writ-
ten as
ρeABE =
1
2
(
|01〉〈01|AB ⊗ ρE + |10〉〈10|AB ⊗ UEρEU
†
E
− |01〉〈10|AB ⊗ ρEU
†
E − |10〉〈01|AB ⊗ UEρE
)
.(3)
From this expression, it is easy to obtain the tagged-
message in the channel:
ρeE =
1
2
(ρE + UEρEU
†
E). (4)
On the reception side, Bob decodes the information
sent by Alice performing the unitary decoding operation
DBE = |0〉〈0|BU
†
E + |1〉〈1|B1E (5)
on his qubit of the singlet and the tagged-message re-
ceived: ρdABE = DBEρ
e
ABED
†
BE . Using (3) and (5) in this
equation one can easily calculate the decoded tagged-
message as ρdE = trAB(ρ
d
ABE) = ρE . Finally, Bob verifies
the state of the tag: He performs the orthogonal mea-
surement {|0〉〈0|T , |1〉〈1|T } over the tag-portion of ρdE ,
where |1〉T is the state in T orthogonal to the tag |0〉T .
If the result of such a measurement is |0〉T , Bob should
assume that no tampering has taken place, and therefore
extract the quantum message sent to him; otherwise, he
rejects the message received.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the previous section we have claimed that the pro-
posed tag-based quantum authentication protocol pro-
vides perfect deterministic decoding. This means that
the protocol would fail only if Bob accepted a message as
an authenticated one when that is not the case (due to
the unnoticed action of Eve). When dealing with forgery
strategies we must consider two main types of attacks:
The no-message attack, and the message attack [2]. The
first one is the simpler: Before any message is sent by
Alice to Bob, Eve attempts to prepare a quantum state
that passes the decoding algorithm. The message attack
is more subtle and severe: Eve could access the authentic
messages transmitted, and try to produce a forged mes-
sage based on the information gained. In the following
discussion we shall show how, unlike the case of authen-
tication of classical messages [12], when dealing with a
one-qubit message it is impossible to select a unitary op-
eration UE that makes all Eve’s possible attacks unsuc-
cessful. We find necessary conditions for the probability
of successful forgery by a no-message attack (in section
IIIA), and by a measurement attack (in section IIIB-1),
to be less than one. Then in section IIIB-2 we show that
under these conditions, there exists another attack, con-
sisting of a unitary operator applied to the message and
tag system, that succeeds with probability one.
A. No-message attack
Suppose that Eve prepares some quantum state ρEE ∈ E
and sends it to Bob trying to impersonate Alice. When
Bob receives this quantum message he cannot know that
it comes from a forger, so he follows the procedure ex-
plained in the previous section: He performs the decod-
ing operation DBE and then an orthogonal measurement
{|0〉〈0|T , |1〉〈1|T } over the tag space. Before all this takes
place, Bob ‘sees’, as the encoded global state, the density
operator ρeABE = |ψ〉〈ψ|AB ⊗ ρ
E
E . After Bob’s decoding,
the tagged-message is given by
ρdE = trAB
(
ρdABE
)
=
1
2
(
ρEE + U
†
Eρ
E
E UE
)
, (6)
where ρdABE = DBEρ
e
ABED
†
BE . As we have seen, Bob
rejects the message if the result of his orthogonal mea-
surement on T is |1〉T ; therefore, the probability Pf that
Eve deceives Bob is:
Pf = 〈0|trM
[
1
2
(
ρEE + U
†
Eρ
E
E UE
)]
|0〉T . (7)
This quantity depends both on Eve’s strategy —her se-
lection of ρEE— and on the quantum operation UE . She
will succeed with probability one if she chooses a ρEE that
satisfies
trM
(
ρEE
)
= |0〉〈0|T , (8)
and
trM
(
U †Eρ
E
E UE
)
= |0〉〈0|T . (9)
In order to check whether Eve succeeds, let us first
consider the case in which she prepares a pure state
4ρEE = |φ〉〈φ|E . The conditions (8) and (9) above can
then be rewritten as
trM (|φ〉〈φ|E ) = |0〉〈0|T , (10)
and
trM
(
U †E |φ〉〈φ|EUE
)
= |0〉〈0|T , (11)
respectively. From equation (10) we conclude that Eve
should choose |φ〉E = |ψ〉M ⊗ |0〉T , with |ψ〉M any pure
state in M. When this result is used in (11), then
U †E (|ψ〉M ⊗ |0〉T ) = |ω〉M ⊗ |0〉T (12)
should also be satisfied, where |ω〉M is some pure state
in M.
Without loss of generality, let us write UE in the form
UE =
1∑
i,j=0
Uij ⊗ |i〉〈j|T , (13)
where the Uij , with i, j = 0, 1, act on M. With this
notation, condition (12) requires U †
01
|ψ〉M = 0, i.e., the
operator U01 must be singular. Therefore, if Alice and
Bob select a unitary operation UE such that U01 is non-
singular, then Pf < 1 for any pure state prepared by
Eve.
What if Eve prepares a general mixed state ρEE ? Any
mixed state in E can be spectrally decomposed as ρEE =∑
3
i=0 λi|φi〉〈φi|E , where 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1,
∑
3
i=0 λi = 1, and
〈φi|φj〉E = δij , i, j = 0, · · · , 3. When this decomposition
of ρEE is used in (8) and (9), these equations are trans-
formed into a problem equivalent to the one posed by
equations (10) and (11). Therefore, also in this more
general case we can assure the result Pf < 1. In fact, we
can further show that, with the appropriate selection of
UE , Pf can be made at most 1/2. As we have seen, Pf
can be written as
Pf = 〈0|trM
(
ρdE
)
|0〉T , (14)
with ρdE =
(
ρEE + U
†
Eρ
E
E UE
)
/2. Defining the projector
P = |00〉〈00|E + |10〉〈10|E , Pf = tr
(
ρdEP
)
. Using the
properties of the trace operator,
Pf = tr
(
ρEE Q
)
/2, (15)
where Q = UEPU
†
E + P is a positive operator known to
Eve, and with maximum eigenvalue λmax ≥ 1. Therefore,
the maximizing ρEE is any eigenvector corresponding to
λmax, and thus Pf = λmax/2. Finally, it is easy to see
(see, e.g., [16]) that choosing UE such that it takes P to
its orthogonal complement makes λmax = 1, and then,
as predicted, Pf = 1/2.
B. Message attack
This is a more subtle and severe family of attacks. In-
stead of directly forging a quantum message and send it
to Bob, Eve could wait for Alice’s message and manipu-
late it. Proceeding this way she tries to convert authen-
tic messages into others with high probability of passing
Bob’s test.
In order to simplify the analysis, and without loss of
generality, we shall distinguish between two types of mes-
sage attacks. In the first one, Eve tries to extract infor-
mation, by means of the appropriate measurement of the
message in the channel, that allows her to prepare a dif-
ferent message that Bob regards as authentic. In the sec-
ond class of attacks, Eve does not care about the current
message in the channel. Instead, based on the knowledge
of all the public aspects of the quantum authentication
scheme used, she determines a quantum operation and
applies it to any data sent by Alice. This quantum oper-
ation can be described by a TPCP map.
1. Measurement
According to equation (4), the information to which
Eve has access is
ρeE =
1
2
[ρM ⊗ |0〉〈0|T + UE(ρM ⊗ |0〉〈0|T )U
†
E ]. (16)
Since Eve knows how the protocol works, she could get
information about the key if, performing the appropri-
ate measurement on the channel, she could perfectly dis-
tinguish between the two terms on the right-hand side
of (16). If Eve managed to achieve it, she would col-
lapse the state of Alice and Bob shared-key in a known
unentangled pure quantum state, so she could throw
away the authentic message and prepare and send to
Bob a new one that would pass his test. Because Eve
does not know which quantum message, ρM, has been
sent, the only way to discern between the two terms
is by means of their tag-portions. Therefore, in or-
der to make this strategy successful, the states |0〉〈0|T
and trM
[
UE (ρM ⊗ |0〉〈0|T )U
†
E
]
must be perfectly dis-
tinguishable, i.e.,
〈0|trM
[
UE (ρM ⊗ |0〉〈0|T )U
†
E
]
|0〉T = 0. (17)
Making use of the spectral decomposition of ρM (see our
reasoning in Section III A), the requirement above can be
alternatively written, without loss of generality, as
trM
(
UE |φ〉〈φ|M ⊗ |0〉〈0|T U
†
E
)
= |1〉〈1|T , (18)
where |φ〉M is any state in M. Equation (18) is satisfied
when UE (|φ〉M ⊗ |0〉T ) = |ω〉M ⊗ |1〉T , where |ω〉M is
5some state in M. Following a procedure parallel to the
one employed in Section III A, we obtain the requirement
that U00 must be singular. Therefore, if Alice and Bob
select an operation UE such that U00 is nonsingular, Eve
cannot infer from her measurement the necessary infor-
mation about the key.
2. TPCP map
Consider that Alice sends to Bob a quantum tagged-
message ρE . If no eavesdropping takes place, the state
in the channel is given by (4). But, assume now that
Eve has the power to perform an arbitrary TPCP map,
$, on the tagged-message sent. Eve wants to choose $
such that the decoding procedure performed by Bob on
the resulting state led to any state not equal to ρM while
the tag remains in the state |0〉T .
The global state resulting from Bob’s decoding
operation after Eve’s TPCP mapping is ρdABE =
DBEρEABED
†
BE , where ρ
E
ABE = $ (ρ
e
ABE), with ρ
e
ABE given
by (3). The tagged-message decoded by Bob is
ρdE = trAB
(
ρdABE
)
=
1
2
[
$ (ρE) + U
†
E$
(
UEρEU
†
E
)
UE
]
.
(19)
The probability of Bob’s accepting the message as a valid
one is PTPCP = 〈0|trM
(
ρdE
)
|0〉T . Clearly, this probabil-
ity is one if and only if trM(ρdE) = |0〉〈0|T , which means
that the conditions
trM [$ (ρE)] = |0〉〈0|T , (20)
trM
[
U †E$
(
UEρEU
†
E
)
UE
]
= |0〉〈0|T , (21)
must be simultaneously satisfied. In order to check
whether Eve succeeds, let us first consider the most sim-
ple case of TPCP, that in which she performs a unitary
operation AE . Using again the spectral decomposition
of ρM (see, again, our reasoning in Section III A), the
conditions above can be alternatively written as
trM
[
AE (|φ〉〈φ|M ⊗ |0〉〈0|T )A
†
E
]
= |0〉〈0|T , (22)
trM
[
BE (|φ〉〈φ|M ⊗ |0〉〈0|T )B
†
E
]
= |0〉〈0|T , (23)
where |φ〉M is any state inM, and BE = U
†
EAEUE . Then,
it is straightforward to see that, in order to fulfill (22) and
(23), Eve needs to choose a unitary operation such that
AE =
1∑
i=0
Aii ⊗ |i〉〈i|T , (24)
BE =
1∑
i=0
Bii ⊗ |i〉〈i|T , (25)
where the Aii and Bii, i = 0, 1, are some unitary opera-
tions on the state spaceM. Since BE and AE are related
by BE = U
†
EAEUE , we can arrange equations (24) and
(25) in matrix form and write
(
U †
00
U †
10
U †
01
U †
11
)
·
(
A00 0
0 A11
)
·
(
U00 U01
U10 U11
)
=
(
B00 0
0 B11
)
.
(26)
According to our formulation of the problem, Eve would
succeed in her attack if, given the unitary operator UE ,
she could always find two unitary operators AE and BE
such that UEBE = AEUE . Of course, the trivial solution
AE = BE = IE (Eve does not modify the state of the
tagged-message) is discarded.
In Section III A we have shown that Alice and Bob
can avoid Eve’s forgering of messages if U01 is nonsingu-
lar. In a similar way, in Section III B 1 we have seen that
Alice and Bob can prevent Eve from gaining critical in-
formation about the key by way of measurement if U00 is
also nonsingular. If we assume now that these conditions
hold, i.e., that U00 and U01 are nonsingular, then it can
be shown, using the unitarity of UE , that U10 and U11
are then also nonsingular. Under these conditions, as we
show in Appendix A, the equation UEBE = AEUE has al-
ways (for any UE) the prescripted solution, and Eve can
always be successful in her attack. This unconditional
success of Eve’s attack makes unnecessary to consider
the more general case of a TPCP map.
C. Discussion on the structure of the tag space
Let us now briefly explain why increasing the dimen-
sion of the tag space does not affect any of the arguments
considered in this section.
As seen by Eve, the key shared by Alice and Bob
controls whether the quantum state in the channel be-
longs to the two-dimensional subspace spanned by the
vectors {|0〉M|0〉T , |1〉M|0〉T } or to the one spanned by
{UE (|0〉M|0〉T ) , UE (|1〉M|0〉T )}, so there are two alter-
native coding subspaces for the valid quantum messages.
All the conditions the unitary operator UE has to fulfill
in order to avoid Eve’s attacks can be geometrically in-
terpreted as conditions on the relative position between
these two code subspaces of the four-dimensional space
E . For instance, in order to avoid the success of the no-
message attack, as stated by the conditions (8)-(9), the
subspaces must span E . On the other hand, in order to
avoid the measurement attack, condition (17), both sub-
spaces must be non-orthogonal. As for the unitary at-
tack, we have seen that Eve can always fulfill conditions
(24)-(25), i.e. she can always find a unitary operator act-
ing on E such that it leaves invariant both subspaces at
the same time, independently of their relative position,
and rotate the vectors within in a non trivial way.
If the dimension of T is increased, the dimension of
the space E also increases (say to N , with N > 4),
6but if the valid tag state is still some particular state
|0〉T ≡ |0 · · · 0〉T , the dimension of the two alternative
code subspaces will remain equal to two. Thus we are
just embedding the problem in a larger space, but not
changing its intrinsic complexity: In a N -dimensional
space Alice and Bob would still be able to choose two
two-dimensional code subspaces neither linearly depen-
dent nor orthogonal, and Eve would still find a unitary
nontrivial operator in U(N) whose restriction to the par-
ticular four-dimensional space containing the two codes
leaves both codes invariant.
One may also consider what would happen if we al-
lowed the tag state to be a mixed, ρT , rather than a
pure state. According to our protocol, in order to have
perfect deterministic decoding, the tag should belong to
any subspace of the tag space (so that Alice an Bob could
perfectly distinguish between valid or invalid messages).
When measuring a mixed state one can obtain any state
belonging to the subspace the mixed state has support
on (with a certain probability, given by the spectral de-
composition). Consequently, when Bob verifies the tag,
he will consider as valid any result giving a state inside
that subspace, and will discard the message if the result
lays in the orthogonal complement. Since the dimension
of the two distinct code subspaces increases, things are
slightly more complicated when the tag is not pure. Let
n < N be the dimension of the valid code subspaces, and
let us see whether we can generalize conditions (8)-(9)
and (17)-(18).
Generalization of conditions (8)-(9) above is achieved
if and only if, for some state ρEE , the states trM
(
ρEE
)
and trM
(
U †Eρ
E
E UE
)
belong to the valid tag subspace.
But, as argued above, this can be avoided by Alice and
Bob choosing an operator UE such that the block of U
†
E
transforming states from the valid tag subspace to the
invalid one (the analogous to U †
01
in (13)) is nonsingular.
Note that if n < N/2 this block is not a square operator,
and nonsingular means with trivial kernel. Note also that
choosing n > N/2 (a subspace of valid messages bigger
than the invalid one) is insecure, since there would always
be vectors of the valid subspace transformed into the null
state by that block, and so Eve would be successful in the
no-message attack with probability one.
Generalization of equations (17)-(18), related to the
measurement attack, is achieved if and only if the state
trM
[
UE (ρM ⊗ ρT )U
†
E
]
belongs to the invalid tag sub-
space. But again this can be avoided choosing UE such
that the equivalent to block U00 (now a n
2-dimensional
block operator, transforming states within the valid tag
subspace) is nonsingular.
But the crucial fact is that Eve can still fulfill condi-
tions (24)-(25), i.e., there is always a nontrivial unitary
operator leaving invariant the two code subspaces. To
see this, note that the generalization of equations (20)–
(23) is obtained by simply imposing that the states in
the left-hand side of those equations belong to the valid
tag subspace. Then equations (24)–(26) would have the
same form, apart from the fact that nowA00, B00 and U00
would represent n2-dimensional operators, A11, B11 and
U11 (N −n)
2-dimensional ones, U01 a n× (N −n) opera-
tor, and U10 a (N−n)×n one. The solutions for A00 and
A11 given in the appendix equally hold if n = N/2 (equa-
tions (A4)-(A5) are exactly the same, all the blocks are
square operators, and we can invert them). If n < N/2
then we are just embedding a 2n < N problem into a
larger N -dimensional space, and thus the solution of the
intrinsic problem still exists.
The fact that increasing the dimension of T does not
improve the robustness of the protocol may surprise the
reader familiar with Quantum Error Correction Codes
(QECC). In these codes more qubits of tag are added to
protect against more errors. But note that the nature of
the errors considered is statistical, i.e. they are randomly
generated by the noise in the channel. In QECC the effi-
ciency of the correction capability lays on the assumption
that statistical errors on a large number of qubits are less
likely than those on a small number. The errors consid-
ered here, arbitrary unitary actions on the space E , do
not belong to this category.
IV. CONCLUSION
Providing message authentication is one of the main
goals of communication security. Classical message-
authentication methods can be combined with quantum
teleportation to make the authentication of quantum in-
formation possible. However, it is not yet clear whether
this procedure is optimal in the resources it requires. In
this paper we study the authentication of elementary
quantum messages (qubits) using minimum-size keys.
Specifically, we have generalized a previous class of quan-
tum authentication protocols [12] to the case of one-qubit
messages, and studied its security against a forger with
quantum power and full access to the channel between
the communicating parties. The main result of this study
is that, unlike classical binary messages, the intrinsic na-
ture of quantum information makes the authentication
of one qubit using a minimal key impossible, i.e. it is
not possible to keep the failure probability of the qubit
authentication protocol below one. We are currently in-
vestigating the minimum amount of quantum resources
needed to authenticate a qubit, and the use of more gen-
eral quantum operations (TPCP maps) in the encoding
and decoding actions. Our results will be published else-
where.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix we show that, given a unitary opera-
tor UE , acting on a four-dimensional space E = M⊗ T ,
and with the 2 × 2 blocks of its matrix representa-
tion nonsingular, one (Eve) can always find two uni-
tary, block-diagonal operators , AE and BE , such that
U †EAEUE = BE .
The explicit expressions for the operators in their block
form can be written as:
UE =
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
Uij ⊗ |i〉〈j|T , (A1)
AE =
1∑
i=0
Aii ⊗ |i〉〈i|T , (A2)
BE =
1∑
i=0
Bii ⊗ |i〉〈i|T . (A3)
From the equality of the blocks resulting from multiply-
ing by |0〉〈1|T and |1〉〈0|T both sides of U
†
EAEUE = BE ,
we obtain the equations:
U †
10
A11U11 + U
†
00
A00U01 = 0, (A4)
U †
11
A11U10 + U
†
01
A00U00 = 0. (A5)
Since all the Uij blocks are invertible, we have the fol-
lowing two expressions for A11:
A11 = −U
†−1
10
U †
00
A00U01U
−1
11
= −U †
−1
11
U †
01
A00U00U
−1
10
(A6)
The second equality in this equation implies:
A00U01U
−1
11
U10U
−1
00
= U †
−1
00
U †
10
U †
−1
11
U †
01
A00, that is,
A00G = G
†A00, with G = U01U−111 U10U
−1
00
. Using the
following relation between the Uij blocks, derived from
the unitarity of UE ,
U †
00
U01 + U
†
10
U11 = 0, (A7)
we can write G = −U−1
†
00
U †
10
U10U
−1
00
, so G is hermitian,
and, therefore, A00 and G commute. Any hermitian op-
erator commutes with some unitary operator that is not
a scalar multiple of the identity, so this guarantees A00
exists. Given A00, we can obtain A11 from (A6). Now it
remains to be shown that such A11 is also unitary. Com-
puting the adjoint of the first expression in (A6) and
multiplying it by the second, we obtain:
A†
11
A11 = U
†−1
11
U †
01
A†
00
U00U
−1
10
U †
−1
11
U †
01
A00U00U
−1
10
.
(A8)
From (A7), U †
11
U10 = −U
†
01
U00. Applying this result to
the equation above leads to
A†
11
A11 = −U
−1†
11
U †
01
A†
00
A00U00U
−1
10
(A9)
= −U−1
†
11
U †
01
U00U
−1
10
= U−1
†
11
U11U10U
−1
10
= I,
and, therefore, A11 is unitary.
As for B00 and B11, they can be obtained, in terms
of A00 and A11, from the equality between the blocks of
U †EAEUE = BE , when both of its sides are multiplied by
|0〉〈0|T and |1〉〈1|T . Their unitarity is proven in a similar
way.
